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A common prescription for reducing the numberof uninsured is to
increase the tax subsidization of health insurance in theU.S. Yet, we
already provide over $100 billionper year in tax subsidies to health
insurance. This paper provides an assessment of thepast and potential
impacts of taxation on health insurancecoverage and costs. I begin by
reviewing the central facts on health insurance andtaxation. I then
provide a framework for assessing the impacts of taxpolicies on health
insurance coverage and costs, and I review the existingempirical evi-
dence on the key behavioral parameters requiredto model these im-
pacts. I conclude with the policy implications of these findings fortax
policies to expand insurance coverage.
1. INTRODUCTION
Uninsurance is one of the worst social problems in the U.S.,and it has
continued to worsen as the economy has improved throughoutthe 1980s
and the 1990s. In 1987, 14.8 percent of non-elderlyAmericans were
without health insurance. Over the next decade, the non-elderlypopula-
tion without insurance coverage grew by nearly 25percent, to 18 per-
cent, before falling for the first time in two decades lastyear. Still,
I am grateful to Jim Poterba for comments and to Robin McKnight,Tracey Seslen, and Avi
Ebenstein for excellent research assistance.38Gruber
despite the recent good news, over 42million Americans lack health
insurance.
The problem of the uninsured has been amajor focus of policy debate
throughout the 1990s. The most prominentexample was the proposed
national health insurance plan of the ClintonAdministration, which was
resoundingly defeated in 1994 (Cutler and Gruber,2001). Tax incentives
to expand health insurance coveragehave also been considered continu-
ally through the last decade, and receivedparticular attention during the
presidency of George H. Bush and again inthe presidential election
campaign of 2000. In recent years, proposals havebeen made to offer tax
credits to individuals to buy insurance inthe non-group market (by
President Bush); to expand those credits to coverthe cost to individuals
of their group insurance policies (by theProgressive Policy Institute);
and to provide credits to firms to induce them tooffer insurance (by a
number of members of Congress).
But the existence of these proposals should notbe taken to imply that
the U.S. doesn't already dramatically subsidizethe provision of insurance
in the workplace. In fact, the exclusionof employer (and some employee)
health insurance expenditures from the income taxbase costs the govern-
ment over $100 billion in lost revenuesannually (Shiels and Hogan, 1999).
Indeed, some tax-based proposals would end orlimit this exclusion of
health insurance from the income tax base, and usethe resulting funds to
offer tax subsidies to individuals for insurancepurchase.
Disentangling the costs and benefits of these alternativeapproaches to
tax subsidization of health insuranceis difficult, and revolves centrally
around a series of behavioral parameters thatdetermine how individuals
and firms will respond to changes in the tax treatmentof health insurance.
An incomplete list of such parametersincludes: the price sensitivity of the
decision of firms to offer health insurance; theprice sensitivity of the take-
up decision, conditional onoffering, of employees; the price sensitivity of
insurance demand among those not offeredinsurance; the influence of
subsidies on the structure of employer-provided insuranceplans, such as
employee premium sharing. Despite the importanceof these issues, how-
ever, we have remarkablylittle evidence on the key behavioral elasticities,
and the evidence that does exist is oftencontradictory.
The purpose of this paper is to lay out aframework for researchers and
policymakers to think about how tax policies mightaffect the level and
distribution of health insurance coverage in theU.S. I begin by review-
ing the key facts that are relevant tothinking about health-insurance
policy. I then turn to a discussion of the central parametersthat we need
to know to fully model both theeffect of the existing tax subsidy and the
effects of tax-based approaches to increasing insurancecoverage in theTaxes and Health Insurance39
U.S. I then discuss what we know about theseparameters. Finally, I
discuss the implications of the facts andour existing knowledge for the
design of tax policy toward health insurance in the U.S.
2. THE FACTS
There are a number of key facts that must be consideredwhen modeling
the effect of taxes on health insurance in the U.S.
2.1 90% of Insurance Coverage Is Employer-Based
The predominant source of insurancecoverage in the U.S. is employer-
based insurance. This is shown in Table 1, from EBRI (2000),which
shows the sources of insurance coverage in the U.S.over time. A fairly
constant feature of insurance coverage has been thatmore than 9 in 10 of
those who are privately insured derive their insurance froman em-
ployer, generally their own, their spouse's,or their parents'.
Why is the employment setting the predominantsource of insurance
coverage? There are three potential reasons. First, theremay be substan-
tial economies of scale in administering insurance whichincrease the
value of pooling mechanisms. Second, the major problem facingprovid-
ers of insurance is adverse selection, so that insurers are constantly
searching for means of pooling large groups of individuals alongdimen-
sions exogenous to health in order toensure a predictable distribution of
medical costs. Workplaces provide just sucha pooling mechanism.
Finally, the U.S. tax code subsidizes health insurancepurchase
through the firm relative to the non-group market by excludingthe value
of that insurance from an individual's income, for bothincome and
payroll tax purposes. This leads toa very large effective subsidy to the
cost of health insurance for workers. The result of this subsidy isthat
there is a lower "tax price" of insurance:
1 - Tf - T- T55 - Tmc TP -
1 + T55 + Tmc
where Tf is the federal income tax marginal rate,; is the state income tax
marginal rate,; is the marginal payroll tax rate for the OASDI program
(the 6.2-percent tax rate that is levied equallyon employees and employ-
ers); and Tmc is the marginal payroll tax rate for the MedicareHI pro-
gram.1 I differentiate the last two programs because, beginningin the
1 The reason that the payroll tax rate is additivein the denominator is that the employer is
indifferent between purchasing one dollar of benefits and payingwages of 1/(1 + ;, + Tm,),
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early 1990s, the taxable maximum for the HIprogram was increased
above that for the OASDI program (andwas eventually removed alto-
gether); the marginal rate is zero above the taxablemaximum for payroll
taxation. For a typical worker in the 15-percent tax bracket, facinga
5-percent state tax rate and a 15.3-percent combined payrolltax rate,
this tax price is roughly 0.65; a dollar of health insurancecosts 35 cents
less than a dollar of other goods purchased with after-taxwages.
In addition, there are also tax subsidies availableto employees for
their spending on employer-provided health insurance, undersection
125 of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 125 generally providesthat an
employee in a cafeteria plan wifi not havean amount included in gross
income solely because the employee may chooseamong two or more
benefits consisting of cash and qualified benefits. A qualifiedbenefit
generally is any benefit that is excludable fromgross income under the
Code, including health insurance, group-term life insurance,401(k)
plans, child care, and adoption assistance.
While employee contributions can therefore be excluded fromtaxation
with a section 125 plan, protection of employee contributionsis far from
complete. The data on the prevalence of sucharrangements are sketchy.
The most recent available data, from Kaiser Family Foundation(2000),
suggest that half of all workers are in firms that offered such flexible
benefit plans. The reason for less than fullcoverage of this generous tax
benefit is unclear, but some of it may have to do withextensive IRS
regulation of these arrangements to ensure that theyare not abused. For
example, the regulations state that nomore than 25% of the benefits of a
plan can be attributed to any "highly compensated" employee,essen-
tially ruling out the availability of section 125 plans forvery small firms.
Moreover, there are strict and complicated rules that limit theflexibility
of employees to switch sources of insurancecoverage during the year if
they are paying their health insurance contributionson a pre-tax basis.
Perhaps as a result of these inherent advantages of thegroup insur-
ance market, the non-group insurance market has not provideda very
hospitable environment for insurance purchase. Load factorsin this mar-
ket are high, and the generosity of the typical policy ismuch lower than
in the group market (Gruber and Madrian, 1996). Arecent study by the
Kaiser Family Foundation found that, for those individualsin less than
perfect health, it was often not possible toget coverage that was fully
comprehensive, the particular illness of the individual often beingunder-
written out of the policy. Prices were alsovery variable in this market,
making it difficult to effectively anticipate thecost of insuring oneself.
There is an existing tax subsidy to thenon-group market itself, for a
particular group: the self-employed. Beginning in 1986,the self-employed42Gruber
were allowed to deduct 25% oftheir insurance premiums from their tax-
able income. This share has grown over time and isslated to reach 100%
by 2003.
2.2 Employer-Based Coverage Has BeenEroding, with Public
Insurance Picking lip Some of the Reduction
The notable time trend in Table 1 has been thesteady erosion of
employer-provided insurance coverage in the post-1987period. The
share of the population with private coverage fellfrom 69.2 to 63.5
percent in 1993, before rising again slowly to65.8 percent. This trend
was partially offset in 1987-1993by a sharp rise in the share of the
population with Medicaid coverage, due to extensiveexpansions in that
program, particularly for children.But the slow rise in employer cover-
age after 1993 has also been offsetby a sharp decline in public coverage,
particularly from 1996 to 1998, which may attribute to anunintended
consequence of welfare reform (seeGruber, 2001, for a review of Medic-
aid program issues).
A striking feature of the erosion in employer-providedinsurance cover-
age is that it was not occurringthrough a decline in employer offering of
health insurance, but rather through a decline in employeetake-up of
that insurance, conditional on it being offered(Cooper and Schone,
1997; Farber and Levy, 1999). A central, andunresolved, mystery is why
we saw this decline in take-up.This period was marked by a rise in the
share of health insurance costs borne by employees(Gruber and
McKnight, 2001). But all available evidence, as I wifi reviewbelow, sug-
gests that take-up of insurance by employees is not verysensitive to its
price. Indeed, takeup of employer-based insurancein general remains
quite high, as I point out below.
2.3 Most of Those Offered Insurance Take It
An key fact for designing tax policy towards theuninsured is that most
of those who are offered insurance by their employerstake it up. This is
illustrated in Table 2, which represents tabulations of insurancetake-up
rates from a 1997 Robert Wood Johnson surveyof employers. This table
cross-tabulates firm size against average earnings in thefirm, and in
each cell lists the take-up rate of insurance,which is computed as the
number of covered employees divided by thenumber of employees
eligible for coverage.
What is striking about this table (in particular inreference to the next
table we wifi see) is the high and uniform rateof take-up across cells.Taxes and Health Insurance43
TABLE 2
Takeup Rates by Firm Size and Average Earnings Categories
Takeup ratea
Average 1-9 10-24 26-49 50-99 >100
earnings ($)employeesemployeesemployeesemployeesemployees
a From author's tabulations of 1997 RobertWood Johnson Foundation survey of employers.
While take-up does rise somewhat with firm size and with earnings,it is
quite high in every cell in this table. If employeesare offered insurance,
they appear to take it up uniformly at quite high rates.
2.4 Insurance Offering Is Highly Correlated with FirmSize and
Average Wage
The offering of insurance, on the other hand, doesvery quite signifi-
cantly across firms, along both of these dimensions. Table 3cross-
tabulates (using somewhat different categories for emphasis) firmsize
and average earnings again, this time summarizing in each cell theaver-
age rate of offering health insurance. Offering of insurance is in fact
quite low for the smallest firms, even at highwage levels, and for larger
firms at the very lowest wage levels.
The correlation with firm size corresponds to thenon-tax arguments
made above for why firms would offer insurance: economies of scaleand
predictability of insurance expenditures both rise with firm size. Indeed,
the Congressional Research Service (1988) reports that the loadingfac-
tors on insurance are roughly 35% higher for the smallest than for the
largest firms. The correlation with averagewages may reflect prefer-
ences across firms for insurance offering; but it is notable that when
insurance is offered in these low-age firms, employees then takeit up at
a high rate. This suggest some disconnect between the offering and take-
up decisions, which I will return to in the evidence section below.
Given these last two pieces of evidence, it should not besurprising the
the primary correlate of being uninsured is not being offeredinsurance.
Data from the Current Population Survey data show thatover three-
quarters of the uninsured are not offered health insuranceon their jobs.
<15,000 0.81 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.76
15,000-30,000 0.84 0.83 0.79 0.78 0.82
30,000-50,000 0.88 0.84 0.83 0.90 0.88
>50,000 0.89 0.84 0.89 0.75 0.8844Gruber
TABLE 3
Insurance Offer Rates by Firm Size and AverageEarnings Categories
Offer Ratea
Average 1-9 10-24 25-49 50-99 >100
earnings ($)employeesemployeesemployeesemployeesemployees
From author's tabulations of 1997 Robert Wood Johnson Foundation surveyof employers.
2.5 The Uninsured Are Quite Mixed withthe Insured
Finally, any solution to address the problem of theuninsured, tax-based
or not, must recognize afundamental conundrum: the uninsured are not
an isolated and easilyidentified sub-population. This is illustrated in
Table 4, also from EBRI (2000), which shows the incomedistribution of
the uninsured. The second column shows thenumber of uninsured in
each income category listed in the first column; thethird column shows
the percentage of the uninsured in each income category;and the final
colunm shows the percentage of that category that isuninsured. The last
column is the least surprising: the share of any income groupthat are
uninsured declines with increasing income. What is morestriking is the
second column: there are many uninsured who are not poor or even
near poor. Indeed, almost a quarterof the uninsured live in families with
incomes over $50,000 per year.
This table highlights the difficulty of targeting programs to coverthe
majority of the uninsured. To cover the majority, youmust go fairly high
up in the income distribution.But, as you do so, you enter ranges where
only a small fraction of the group is uninsured.
3. HOW DOES TAX POLICYAFFECT
INSURANCE COVERAGE?
To fully understand how alternative tax policiesmight affect insurance
coverage requires knowledgeof a wide variety of key behavioral parame-
ters. In this section, I review the parametersthat must be measured to
fully assess the range of tax policy effects.
<10,000 0.24 0.45 0.63 0.81 0.95
10,000-15,000 0.32 0.55 0.76 0.88 0.93
15,000-20,000 0.43 0.70 0.83 0.93 0.98
20,000-25,000 0.50 0.77 0.86 0.95 0.97
25,000-30,000 0.55 0.83 0.92 0.91 0.98
>30,000+ 0.61 0.88 0.94 0.95 0.98Taxes and Health Insurance45
a From EBRI (2000).
Figure 1 summarizes the channels through which tax policies might
affect coverage, and the resulting behavioral responses that are key to
assessing tax-policy effects. The leftmost part of this chart shows the
three possible types of tax subsidies to insurance: subsidies to employers
to offer coverage (either reforming the existing subsidy, or offering new
subsidies); subsidies to employees to take up coverage (once again, ei-
ther reforming the existing section 125 option, or offering new subsi-
dies); and subsidies to individuals for non-group insurance coverage.
Each of these types of tax subsidies has effects on both firms andon
individuals, as shown in the middle of the figure. Moreover, the deci-
sions of both firms and individuals feed back to each other. Finally, for
sizable tax interventions, there may be effects on the insurance market
itself which wifi affect the decisions made by firms and workers.
In terms of firm decisionmaking, the key element of response is the
decision to offer insurance in response to an increased subsidy toem-
ployer coverage, or to drop insurance in response to a reduction in the
net subsidy to employer coverage. For increases or reductions in the
existing tax subsidy to employer-provided insurance, these responses
are likely to be symmetric. But a key unresolved question is the extent
to which changes in other subsidies would impact employer decisions.
For example, would a 10% subsidy to employees for their expenditures
on employer-provided insurance have the same impact on insurance
offering as an additional 10% subsidy to employers for their insurance
spending? In terms of simple economic theory, the answer is clearly
yes. But there may be differences in practice that make these responses
asymmetric.
TABLE 4












<5000 4.8 11.4 44.3
5000-9999 3.3 7.8 31.0
10,000-14,999 4.5 10.6 34.6
15,000-19,999 4.5 10.7 32.0
20,000-29,999 6.8 16.1 24.6
30,000-39,999 5.3 12.5 19.4
40,000-49,999 3.3 7.9 13.9
>50,000 9.7 22.9 8.5
Total 42.1 100 17.546Gruber
















For example, subsidies to employers may be targeted by firm size or
some other firm characteristic, but areavailable to the firm as a whole.
But subsidies to employees that are targeted will likely leave some em-
ployees in a firm eligible and others not. While the subsidy amounts may
be the same on average (e.g., a 50-percent subsidy to the firm or a100-
percent subsidy to 50 percent of the workers), in practicethe impacts
may be quite different, depending on howemployee preferences are
aggregated in the determination of benefits.
Similarly, in terms of economic theory, subsidies to non-group and to
group insurance should have similar andopposite effects. But, once
again, in practice the reactions of firms may not be symmetric, since
workers may not view the (currently) inhospitable non-group market as
an effective substitute for the group market.
Firms also have other margins of response besides the decision to offer
(or not to offer) insurance. One important margin is the decision on how
much to contribute to insurance costs. Currently, firms pay about 75
percent of the costs of insurance, but this has fallen dramatically overthe
past 15 years (Gruber and McKnight, 2001). If higher employeepremi-
ums lead employees not to take up theiremployer coverage, then this
shift in costs from employee to employer could be significant. Similarly,
employers may react to tax subsidies by reducing the generosity of their
insurance plans along a variety of dimensions, such as shiftingfrom fee-Taxes and Health Insurance47
for-service to managed care plans, raising patient copayments, or restrict-
ing benefit coverage. Indeed, it is this subsidy on the margin to insurance
costs that led Martin Feldstein to criticize the tax subsidy to employer-
provided insurance in the early 1970s. He claimed that this subsidy
would lead to overly generous insurance coverage, which through moral
hazard would then raise spending on medical care, increasing further the
demand for insurance coverage, and thereby leading to a spiral of rising
medical costs.
Individuals can also respond directly to tax subsidies either to em-
ployee purchases of insurance or to non-group subsidies. There are four
dimensions along which individuals can respond. The first is to change
their take-up of employer-provided insurance, conditional on its being
offered. The second is to move into or out of non-group insurance cover-
age. The third is to move into or out of public insurance coverage. This
channel may seem more controversial, but the majority of those made
eligible for public insurance over the past 15 years have been eligible as
well for employer-provided insurance, so this is a margin of potentially
active substitution. Finally, married couples can shift insurance coverage
from one spouse's job to the other's as the relative subsidy to one spouse
or the other changes.
In addition, the decisions of employers and workers can have feed-
back effects on each other. As employers change their offering of insur-
ance, this will affect employee take-up. Likewise, changes in employer-
provided insurance generosity can affect take-up and decisions to move
across spouses or into public or non-group coverage. Moving the other
direction, when economists model firms' benefit decisions, they do not
think of a firm as a distinct entity, but rather as an aggregation of its
workers. So individuals' responses to tax interventions can also feed
back to firms' decisionmaking. An important research question, alluded
to above, is how worker preferences are aggregated; once again, this
aggregation may differ across types of tax subsidies and along the
margin of employer response (e.g. offering vs. employee contributions).
I discuss the scant evidence on this question below.
Finally, tax policy can affect the insurance market directly. So longas
the market supply for insurance is upward sloping, any major interven-
tion that increases demand wifi lead to a partially offsetting pre-tax rise
in insurance prices. On the other hand, many have argued that the high
and unstable prices in the non-group market reflect the "thinness" of
this market, and that a major subsidy to non-group policies which led to
more purchase could reduce inefficiency and lower prices in that market.
These changes in pretax prices will obviously mitigate or exacerbate any
direct response by firms and individuals to tax incentives.48Gruber
Thus, there are an enormous number of margins that must potentially
be modeled to assess the effect of a full range of tax subsidy options on
insurance coverage. In principle, there are many direct channels from
tax policy to individual and firm behavior, as well as a large number of
potential feedback effects from firms to individuals, from individuals to
firms, and from the market to both. Given the impossibility of estimating
all of these responses, a key question is the extent to which response
symmetry can be called upon to apply behavior from one type of subsidy
to another.
4. WHAT DO WE KNOW ABOUT KEY
BEHAVIORAL PARAMETERS?
There is a large literature devoted to estimating some of the behavioral
parameters that were discussed in section 3. In this section, we review
that literature. We begin by reviewing what is known about firm behav-
ior, then turn to individual behavior.
4.1 Firm Offering Decisions
The behavioral response on which there has been the most work is the
elasticity of insurance offering by firms. There have been several ap-
proaches to estimating this elasticity. The first approach discussed here is
to use variation in the premiums faced by firms to identify the price
sensitivity of their offering decision. Two examples of this work are Feld-
man, Dowd, Leitz, and Blewett (1997), who use informationfrom 1993 for
a sample of small firms in Minnesota to estimate price elasticitiesof 3.9
(single coverage) to 5.8 (family coverage); and Marquis and Long (1999),
who use data from 1993 for 10 states to estimate a much smaller price
elasticity of only 0.14. A key problem with this approach, however, is
that one only observes premiums for the firms that do offer insurance,
and they must be imputed to firms that do not. Thus, instruments must be
found that are correlated with the price of insurance but not firm demand,
and previous articles have not used firm characteristics that are likely to
meet this criterion (e.g. whether the firm is unionized).
The third approach is to use variation in taxation to identify the price
elasticity of offering, in essence asking whether those firms with higher
tax-related subsidies to insurance purchase are more likely to offer insur-
ance. Leibowitz and Chernew (1992) use variation in tax rates across
states to examine the effect of after-tax prices on insurance offering by
small firms, as well as using variation in premium quotes across loca-
tions obtained from small-group insurers. They separately estimate theTaxes and Health Insurance49
response to premiums and subsidies, and obtain an elasticity between
0.8 (premiums) and 2.9 (subsidies). Royalty (1999) also uses cross-
state variation in marginal tax rates to estimate an elasticity of firms'
insurance offering across all employers at 0.63. Gentry and Peress
(1994) study cross-city differences in the average share of workers of-
fered health insurance benefits, as a function of cross-state differences in
after-tax prices of insurance. They find that for each percentage-point
increase in the price of health insurance, the fraction of blue-collar work-
ers covered by employer-provided insurance declines by 1.8 percentage
point, implying an elasticity of 1.4; however, there is no statistically
significant effect for white collar workers.
These types of studies have the advantage that differences across cities
and states in tax rates should be independent of insurance-offering deci-
sions. But they may not be entirely independent: cities and states with
substantial taste for insurance may be the ones that offer the largest tax
breaks, which would lead to a strong relationship between price and
offering. This criticism is addressed in recent work by Finkelstein (1999),
who studies the removal of the large (25%) tax subsidy to supplemental
private health insurance in Quebec in 1993, and finds an elasticity of
0.42 to 0.54 for employer offering. But it is somewhat unclear how to
apply the elasticity of offering of supplemental insurance for a national
health insurance scheme to the decision of U.S. firms to offer full private
health insurance plans.
A third approach comes from running small-scale subsidy pilot pro-
grams for small businesses and evaluating the response of firms to subsi-
dized prices. These pilot programs have the advantage of essentially
providing a randomized intervention. Two such pilot programs are
evaluated in Helms, Gauthier, and Campion (1992) and in Thorpe et al.
(1992). The former study finds a wide variety of price responsiveness
across sites, with sites such as Utah offering 40% discounts and seeing
only 4% enrollment among uninsured firms (an elasticity of only 0.1)
and other sites such as Arizona offering 10% discounts and seeing 4-
11% enrollment (an elasticity of 0.4 to 1.1). The latter finds very weak
response to a program that provided a 50% subsidy to the price of
insurance for small firms in New York, with an elasticity of only 0.07 to
0.33. But it is unclear whether the small elasticities estimated here are
because of the temporary experimental nature of these subsidies; firms
may be reluctant to set up insurance plans based on subsidies that wifi
only last for a short time. There could be much larger responses to more
permanent changes in the after-tax price of insurance.
A final approach is to use responses of firms to hypothetical questions
about changes in the price of insurance. Morrisey, Jensen, and Merlock50Gruber
(1994) use the response to such hypothetical questions to estimate a price
elasticity of insurance offering among small firms of 0.92. But it is un-
clear whether firms respond in the same way to hypothetical questions as
they do when faced with an actual insurance purchase decisions.
A final issue with this literature is that, with firm-level data, one does
not observe the characteristics of the employees to which the firm is
responding in making its benefit decisions: who is the marginal worker
whose preferences determine the firm's decisions? One article which
attempts to address both the identification and marginal-worker issues
is Gruber and Poterba (1994). They study how the self-employed re-
sponded to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which introduced a subsidy to
the insurance purchases of the self-employed. This natural experiment
provides exogenous variation in the after-tax price of insurance. More-
over, for the self-employed, there is no issue of decidingwho is the
marginal worker. They find significant increases in the insurance cover-
age of the self-employed relative to the employed over thisperiod, with
an implied price elasticity as large as 1.8. Unfortunately, however,it is
unclear how generalizable these results are to firms, which must aggre-
gate the preferences of all their workers in making benefit decisions.
A more recent approach to surmounting these problems is Gruber and
Lettau (2000). In that paper, the authors use data from the Employee
Compensation Index (ECI) dataset, which collects information both on
firm insurance provisions and on the characteristics of a sample of work-
ers in the firm. The latter feature allows them todirectly measure the
distribution of tax rates within the firm, and to assess which tax rate
seems to be most central in driving benefit provision decisions.They
also introduce a new identification strategy, extending the previous tax-
based work to rely on state tax progressivity and changes in state taxes
over time, while controlling for mean differences across statesthat are
likely to be correlated with tastes for insurance. They estimate an elastic-
ity of insurance offering of 0.3 to 0.4, towards the lower end of the
previous literature. Gruber (2001) recently applied the identification strat-
egy of Gruber and Lettau's paper to data fromthe Current Population
Survey, which gathers data on a random sample of workers but not on
the distribution of workers in a firm. He finds a higher elasticity of
offering of 0.7 in these data. But the ECI estimates seem more reliable
in view of the higher quality of the data.
4.2. Employer Insurance Spending
There is also a sizable literature on the effect of after-tax prices on em-
ployer insurance spending. Estimates of this elasticity come from three
types of studies. The first is time-series evidence on how total spendingTaxes and Health Insurance51
on employer-provided health insurance responds to changes in federal
tax rates, presented in Long and Scott (1982), Vroman and Anderson
(1984), and Turner (1987). These studies typically yield estimates of the
price elasticity of demand between 0 and 0.5. But the results are hard
to interpret, as there are many things changing in the time-series data;
for example, the fact that health insurance coverage fell in the 1980smay
be the result of declining marginal tax rates, but it may also be the result
of a shift in the job base towards service jobs that are less likely to
provide insurance.
A second set of studies, including Taylor and Wilensky (1983), Holmer
(1984), and Sloan and Adamache (1986), analyze cross-sectional dataon
individuals or firms and ask whether those with higher tax-related subsi-
dies to insurance purchase spend more on insurance coverage. Buta
potential problem with these studies is that differences across individu-
als in their tax rates arise in part from differences in the underlying
behavior of individuals or firms, such as differences in labor supply,
family structure, or the nature of the work force. It is impossible to tell
whether differences in observed insurance coverage are due to taxesor
these behavioral differences. A wide range of estimates emerge from
these studies; Pauly (1986) summarizes the consensus rangeas 0.2 to
more than 1.0.
The final approach that attempts to overcome the problems inherent in
the previous cross-sectional literature examines how demand for insur-
ance responds to plausibly independent legislated tax differences. Wood-
bury and Hammermesh (1992) analyze all fringe-benefit expenditures
around the Tax Reform Act of 1986 in a panel data set of colleges and
universities. They conclude that tax reform substantially reduced the de-
mand for fringes, with an estimated elasticity in excess of 2. But this is
not focused on health insurance spending per se, so it is difficult to disen-
tangle the impact on health insurance.
Gruber and Lettau (2000), in the study described above, also examine
the impact of tax subsidies on employer-provided insurance spending,
using similar variation across states in their tax systems to Woodbury
and Hamermesh. They also find a quite large elasticity of insurance
spending: 0.94.
4.3 Employer Contributions to Health Insurance
A particularly important margin of response to tax subsidies is how
employers change their contributions to health insurance for employees.
This response would be subsumed in the spending elasticities cited
above, but it is important to break it out distinctly due to the potential
impact of changing contributions on employee take-up.52Gruber
There is only one study of which I am aware on this response.Gruber
and McKnight (2001) use the Current Population Survey to studythe
impact of tax changes on the decisions of employers to pay all of the cost
of their health insurance plans. The share of employers paying all those
costs fell from 44 percent in 1982 to 28 percent by 1998. Theymodel this
variable as a function of a variety of actors, including the tax subsidy to
employer-sponsored insurance. They find that the tax subsidy did have
a very important impact on employer contributionpolicy. Their central
findings suggest that for each 10-percentage-point reduction in the tax
subsidy, the share of employers paying all of the costs of health insur-
ance falls by 1.7 to 3.8 percent.
4.4 Employee Take-up of Employer-Provided Insurance
A central parameter for evaluating the effects of tax subsidypolicy is the
elasticity of employee take-up of employer-provided insurance if it is
offered. As highlighted earlier, take-up among those offered is fairly
high for all firm sizes and average firm wage levels. But does take-up
respond to the prices charged to employees for insurance?
The answer, to date, appears to be no. Two studies have examined
how employee take-up responds to the price charged for insurance
(Chernew, Frick, and McLaughlin, 1997; Blumberg, Nichols and Banthin
2001). Both papers find that firms that charge more for insurance have
no lower take-up of their insurancepolicies. These papers do run into
the possible problem that firm premium decisions are endogenous to
employee tastes. The direction of bias here is unclear, and depends on
whether firms set low employee premiums when there are tastes for
insurance, or when there are not (because of paternalism or tosatisfy
insurance-company conditions for high employee take-up).Gruber
(2001) also investigates this question by assessing whether the existing
employer tax subsidy affects coverage, conditional on offering, as it
should for those with a section 125 plan (roughly half of employeesby
the most recent estimates). But I find no such effect.
The lack of elasticity of employee take-up is very striking in view ofthe
time-series trends discussed earlier. Over the mid-1980s through thelate
1990s, the trend was towards rising employer contributionsand falling
employee take-up. This is shown in Figure 2, from Gruber andMcKnight
(2001), which shows the share of workers who have employer-sponsored
insurance over time, and the share of workers whose employers payall of
the costs of insurance over time. As those authors note, there is astriking
correspondence between these series, and a price elasticity of employee
takeup of 0.4 would explain the time-series trend in take-up. Butthis
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FIGURE 2. Group Health Insurancevs. Employer Pays All
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ity. Thus, the cause of this trend towards declining take-upremains a
mystery.
On the other hand, these findings are consistent witha growing body
of evidence which suggests that it is the decisions thatemployers make
for their workers that are most important in determiningworker benefit
provision, not active decisions taken by those employees.The most
striking example is Madrian and Shea (2001), who find thatwhen a firm
moved the default investment option and contribution level forits 401(k)
plan, the vast majority of workers did notmove from that default, de-
spite it being a worse choice for many of them.
4.5 Substitution between Forms of Insurance Coverage
As the lower part of Figure 1 illustrates,a key issue for modeling the
effect of tax policy on individual insurancecoverage is the substitutabil-
ity across different forms of insurancecoverage. The margin of substitut-
ability for which there is the best evidence is substitutionsbetween
private and public coverage. There isa large literature on crowdout over
the past 5 years which examines the question of whetherthose made
eligible for public insurance will drop their privateinsurance to take it
up. The earliest estimates of crowdout suggested it was quite large, with
one person losing private insurance for every two gaining public insur-
ance in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Cutler and Gruber, 1996). But
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subsequent estimates suggest that the effect maybe more modest, on
the order of 10-20 percent; see Dubay (1999)for a review.
There is less evidence on the other key marginsof substitutability,
between own employer coverage, non-group coverage,and spousal
coverage. Gruber (2001) did recentlyextend the analysis of Gruber and
Lettau (2000) to consider the impact of changingthe employer-provided
insurance tax subsidy on all insurance margins, notjust on the mar-
gin of insurance offering. We find that alarger subsidy to employer-
provided insurance causes a reduction in public insurance,consistent
with the crowdout literature. But we find littlesubstitutability with non-
group coverage.
To date, there is little evidence on thesubstitutability of own and
spousal insurance coverage, On net, I find thatthe effect on offering is
almost directly translated to a bottom-lineeffect on being uninsured,
suggesting that employer offering is the key marginof response to exist-
ing subsidies.
4.6 Substitution across Spouses
There is enormous scope for substitution ofhealth insurance coverage
across spouses. For example,of the 28 million male married workers
aged 21-64 who are insured on the job, 15 millionhave wives that are
offered health insurance. More than 8 million reportthat their wives
actually take up the coverage on their jobs. Ofthe 16 million married
female workers aged 21-64 who are insured onthe job, 12 million have
husbands who are offered insurance, and almost 9million of those hus-
bands take up that offer.
With such a large number of spouses who arejointly offered insur-
ance, it would seem thatsubstitution across spouses as policy changes
would be a real possibility. There is only one article thatinvestigates this
issue (Monheit, Schone, and Tayor, 1999),using 1987 data, and their
results suggest that the decision to take double coverage(health insur-
ance coverage through both thehusband and wife), conditional on both
spouses being offered insurance,is very sensitive to incentives. For ex-
ample, they find that the odds of having double coveragerise by more
than a third if both plans are free to the husbandand wife. They also find
that double coverage take-up is higher among thosefamilies in ifi health,
and that it is more common when it results in a morecomprehensive set
of benefit coverage than does take-up by one spousealone.
This set of findings suggest that substitution across spouseswho are
offered insurance may be quite fluid as tax policychanges. How much
substitution there would be depends onhow universal the policy
changes are, and how similar the jobs are thatwives and husbands hold.Taxes and Health Insurance55
For an income-targeted subsidy, for example, it is possible thata hus-
band who works with many low-income workers wifi lose his offerof
health insurance, while his wife who works withmany high-income
workers wifi not.
4.7 The Big Mystery: Take-up among Those Not Offered
At least three-quarters of the uninsured are not offered health insurance.
Thus, in focusing on the effects of tax subsidies onnon-group insurance,
the key question is how price-sensitive this group will be in their take-up
decisions. Unfortunately, we have essentially no evidenceon this critical
question. The one relevant paper is by Marquis and Long (1994), who
estimated the demand for non-group insurancecoverage among work-
ers not offered employer-sponsored coverage as a function of the area-
specific price of non-group coverage. They estimatean elasticity of
non-group coverage of 0.3. The problem with this approach is that the
price of insurance reflects not only true price differences in insurance
(differences in the load factor, or the premium cost relative to expected
claim expenses), but also differences in medical costs and differences in
underlying tastes for insurance. Both of these latter two factors will bias
downward any estimate of the effect of area insurance priceson de-
mand. Thus, we are left with only a lower boundon the elasticity of
insurance take-up among those not eligible for employercoverage.
4.8 How Are Employee Preferences Aggregated?
As noted above, appropriate modeling of the implications of subsidiesto
employer-provided insurance requires an understanding of the mecha-
nism for aggregating employee preferences in the firm's benefits deci-
sions. The best discussion of this issue in the context of benefitprovision
is in Goldstein and Pauly (1976). They conclude that the equilibrium
benefit determination could arise in one of twoways. One is through the
collective choice of the existing set of workers, throughan insider-
outsider or union mechanism. In this case, through standard voting
arguments, the benefits chosen wifi reflect the tastes of the median
worker. The second is through the choices of employers, whosegoal is
to minimize their total labor costs, and wifi therefore design their bene-
fits packages to reflect the average preferences of their workers.
If there is a perfect Tiebout equilibriumacross firms, with workers
sorted completely by their tastes for insurance, then theaverage and
median tax prices wifi be everywhere thesame and the distinction be-
tween these models wifi not be important. However,as Gruber and
Lettau (2000) discuss, there remains considerable dispersion between
these measures within firms; almost 10 percent of firms havea median56Gruber
and a mean tax price which differ by 5 percentage points or more.If
there is imperfect sorting, then these models can have verydifferent
implications, depending on the difference between the medianand the
mean. Further complications arisewhen considering the fact that both
mobility and influence within the firm differ across workers. Firms may
not consider the average of all workers' preferencesin making benefits,
but may weight more highly the preferences of eithermobile workers or
the "most influential" workers in the workplace.
Assessing the appropriate model of within-workplacebenefit determi-
nation is not purely an academic concern. Modelingthe implications of
tax reform may depend critically onappropriately capturing the struc-
ture of how tax prices throughout the firmaffect benefit decisions. If, for
example, the median tax price is the only one that matters,then tax
reforms such as that in 1993 which raised tax rates only atthe top of the
distribution wifi have essentially no impact on insurancedecisions. But
if other movements of the distribution matter, thensuch reforms may
have larger impacts.
Gruber and Lettau investigate this issue by drawing on thestrength of
their ECI data to include several moments of thedistribution of tax prices
in their insurance demand model. They find thatthe median tax price
explains benefit determination significantly better than the average.But
they also find that there is an important additional rolefor the highest-
paid worker in the firm (the worker with the lowest taxprice). So the
appropriate voting model in their context appears to be onewith a
decisive median voter but some extra influence forthe highly paid
worker.
Unfortunately, however, it is not clear if these results, estimated inthe
context of an unlimited tax deduction, extend toother tax-subsidy struc-
tures, such as targeted tax credits. Consider a very generous non-group
credit that pays the full costs of insurance for 49 percentof a firm's
workers, but is zero for those at the median and above. It seemsunlikely
that the firm would not respond at all to such an outside option.In these
types of cases, it may be the mean incentive acrossall workers which
better captures how preferences are aggregated.
4.9 Market Responses
Another mystery area is how markets wifi respond to taxinterventions.
As noted above, tax subsidies could lead to rises orfalls in group or non-
group market insurance prices. Aparticularly critical question is whether,
for non-group subsidies of a given value (such as the Bushplan), non-
group plans will emerge that aretargeted to that dollar value. AdvocatesTaxes and Health Insurance57
of non-group subsidies point to the availability ofvery cheap insurance
plans over the Internet.
But, even if such plans are offered, there is the question ofwhether they
wifi be demanded. After all, even in the face of existing low-costpolicies,
there remain over 42 million uninsuredpersons. An outstanding mystery
in insurance markets is why there is notmore demand for low-cost,
catastrophic policies, given that they insure the substantial riskswe
should be most worried about butcan reduce costly moral hazard. But
given this lack of demand, even the offering of such low-cost policiestied
to subsidy amounts may not significantly increase take-up.2
5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The discussion of section 3 and the evidence presented insection 4 have
several clear implications for tax policy towards insurance. Beforepre-
senting these implications, it is important to consider the goals of subsi-
dizing insurance through the tax code. Presumably, themost important
goal is to raise insurance coverage in the U.S., and in themost cost-
efficient manner. Thus, the discussion below wifi focuson the efficiency
of various alternative policies, measuredas their cost per person newly
insured. But a secondary goal of tax policymay be horizontal equity, or
redistribution to those already paying for their insurance without thetax
subsidies available to others. This is not a goal that will receiveattention
in the discussion below, but it is important to recognize that ifit is the
goal of policy, it may be well served by some of the alternativesI dismiss
as "inefficient" below.
5.1 Reforming the Existing Tax Subsidy
I first consider the implications of reform of the existingtax subsidy to
employer-provided health insurance. One alternative here wouldbe to
end this subsidy, perhaps redistributing the dollarsto other forms of
insurance subsidization. Gruber and Lettau (2000) performsome simula-
tions using their estimates to assess the implications for employeroffer-
ing and insurance spending. The resultsare summarized in Table 5,
which shows the impact of a several alternative reformson the rate of
insurance offering, the level of insurance spending conditionalon offer-
ing, and the overall level of spending. Theranges of estimates reflect the
2Moreover, the low prices of catastrophic policies in today's marketmay reflect positive
selection: such policies wifi only be demanded by the healthy,so that prices can stay low.
When subsidies are available that make such policies cheaper, then theremay be more
demand for them by the sick, which would lead to price rises.58Gruber
TABLE 5
Implications of Reform of Existing Tax Subsidy
'From Gruber and Lettau (2000).
bResult of applying reductions in preceding column to national total foremployer-insured.
alternative models estimated in this paper; to be conservative,in this
discussion I focus on the lower-bound estimates.3
This paper finds that there would be very significant implicationsof
reducing the existing tax subsidy. Completely removingthe existing sub-
sidy, with respect to all (federal and state) income taxes aswell as with
respect to the payroll tax, would lower the rateof employer insurance
offering by 14%. Assuming (following the results in Gruber,2001) that all
of those dropped by their employer would becomeuninsured, this im-
plies that 22 million Americans would become uninsured.This would
represent a roughly 50% rise in the number of uninsured.Moreover, this
paper also finds a very large reduction inspending on those who have
insurance, with the net result being a 50% reductionin the dollars spend
on employer-providedinsurance.4
These are enormous impacts, and the potential for 22 million more
uninsured Americans should lead anyone to pause before removingthe
existing employer subsidy. But it is also important toremember that
the existing subsidy costs over $100 billion per yearin forgone revenue.
So this says that we are spending about $5000 per person toinsure these
22 million persons, a quite high level. So thequestion becomes whether
It is of course important to recognize that these projections are only asprecise as the
underlying estimates; the central estimates on which they are based are aprobit coefficient
on insurance offering of 5.424 (2.017), and anOLS coefficient on log spending of 1.465
(0.404).
The calculations in the final column are conjectural in that they assumethat the firms that
stop offering insurance are spending the average amount oninsurance before dropping. It
seems likely that those firms were spending lessthan average, so that there is a smaller
reduction in overall spending than is implied in Table 5.
Reduction in Change in
Change inemployer-spending among
offeringa insuredb offereda
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other alternatives are available at a more reasonable cost to insure large
numbers of Americans.
Table 5 also shows the impacts of less dramatic reforms to our existing
system. The first is to remove the existing subsidy in the income tax, but in
for the payroll tax. This would still lead to very large reductions in insur-
ance offering and spending, with the potential for 13.6 million more unin-
sured. The final column illustrates that even very modest reforms to the
tax code can have large effects on employer-provided insurance. This
column shows the impact of cutting all tax rates by 10%, roughly akin to
the original proposal of the Bush Administration. Even this very small
change could lead to 1.4 million more uninsured, and a reduction in total
spending on employer-provided insurance of almost 4%.
One potential reform which would may less dramatic implications for
coverage would be not to reduce the existing employer subsidy but to
cap it, for example at the mean or median cost of a group insurance plan.
As discussed in more length in Gruber and Poterba (1996), such a reform
might temper the inflationary aspects of the tax subsidy highlighted by
Feldstein, and significantly raise government revenues, but without
causing a major displacement of the employer-insured. In principle,
administering such a cap would be straightforward: employers would
simply be asked to report, for tax purposes (either income tax aloneor
payroll tax as well), any spending they make on an employee's behalf for
insurance beyond some cap level.
But, in practice, caps run into important administrative and political
difficulties. First, there are very large regional disparities in the cost of
health insurance, which would ideally be reflected in the cap level. But
there has never been a regionally adjusted tax credit, and efforts in other
arenas (e.g. poverty measurement) to have regional adjustment have run
into daunting political difficulties. Second, a cap would penalize workers
for having high-cost co-workers, since it would reflect average and not
individual-specific insurance spending. This would lead to general redis-
tributions from older, higher-cost industries to newer, lower-costones,
raising further daunting difficulties.
5.2 New Subsidies to Employers
A more likely direction for reform is to offer new subsidies to employers.
But doing so immediately runs into the type of efficiency considerations
highlighted above. The majority of employers already offer health insur-
ance. For this group, new subsidies are just redistribution, with no
impact on insurance coverage, except through feedback effects onem-
ployees through reduced employee contributions or more generous in-
surance levels.60Gruber
Thus, to be cost-effective, new subsidies to employers must be well
targeted. Table 2 illustrates how such targeting would be most effective:
if subsidies were largest for the smallest and lowest-wage firms. But
there is a trade-off with targeting: the more targeted are subsidies, the
more distortionary "cliffs" there may be to firms' decisions on payand
hiring. This was in fact an important criticism of the proposed subsidies
to small firms embedded in the Clinton HSA plan.
But such "cliffs" need not in fact arise, so long as there are smooth
phaseouts with respect to wages and firm size. Consider for example the
following subsidy structure:
There is a maximum subsidy rate of 0.4 for firms of 10 employees or
fewer with average annual earnings of $10,000 or less.
The subsidy is reduced by 0.01 for each extra employee above 10, so
that it reaches zero at 50 employees.
The subsidy is also reduced by the amount that earnings rise above
$10,000 per year. This reduction factor is proportional to firm size
that is, the bigger the firm, the faster the subsidy is reduced as wages
rise. The formula is:
Firms of 10 employees or fewer: subsidy reduced by 0.0222 for each
$1000 rise in earnings above $10,000 per year.
Firms of more than 10 employees: subsidy reduced by (firm size)/
450 for each $1000 rise in earnings in hourly wages above $10,000
per year. For example, for a firm of 25, the subsidyis reduced by
0.0555 for each $1000 rise in earnings above $10,000 per year.
I have simulated the effect of such a policy in the RWJF data used to
compute Tables 2 and 3, drawing on the evidence presented above. The
results suggest that for an annual cost of $3.8 billion, 2.2 million persons
could be insured per year, for a cost of $1720 per newly insured. And
there are very low implicit tax rates embedded in this gradual phaseout
structure. On average, for every additional $100 paid out in wages, firms
only lose $1.2 in subsidy; even at the maximum, the subsidy loss is only
$15 per $100 paid out in wages, a modest distortion by the standards of
our tax system. Similarly, for each worker hired,the subsidy loss is on
average only $82; the maximum possible subsidy loss perhire is $720. So
distortions need not be enormous to offer very targeted subsidies.
But one interesting feature is that the efficiency of such firm subsidies
diminishes as they get larger. For example, an expanded version of the
above subsidy plan that delivers a maximum subsidy of 50 percentTaxes and Health Insurance61
would cost 175 percent as much ($6.7 billion/year), but only cover 50
percent more persons (3.3 million), so that the cost per newly covered
rises to $2070. This is a common finding in all simulation work on tax
subsidies: their efficiency is inversely related to their scope. This is be-
cause as the subsidies get larger, they necessarily become less targeted
and more attractive to those who are already providing insurance. Never-
theless, the efficiency of these firm subsidies seems quite high relative to
the other policies considered below.
5.3 New Subsidies to Employees
The second major alternative discussed earlier was new subsidies to em-
ployees to take up employer coverage. The first point to note about such
subsidies is that, as a device for targeting take-up per se, they are likely to
be very inefficient. This is because fewer than 10% of those offered insur-
ance are actually uninsured. Moreover, the work reviewed above sug-
gests that the take-up decision is not very elastic with respect to price.
These two facts are a recipe for an inframarginal subsidy that wifi serve
only as redistribution and not to increase insurance coverage.
But, in a general economic model, such subsidies should also in-
crease employer insurance offering. Indeed, there is no economic ratio-
nale for not treating them symmetrically with a subsidy to employers:
both are subsidies to offering insurance through the workplace. In
practice, however, their effects might differ somewhat. Employer subsi-
dies are targeted to the characteristics of a firm, while employee subsi-
dies are targeted to employees. This has the advantage that it may be
possible to do better income targeting with employee subsidies, since
even low-wage firms have high-wage workers. But it has the disadvan-
tage that it may be harder to target low-wage firms by simply giving
subsidies to low-wage employees. Many low-wage employees work in
high-wage firms that already offer insurance. So even a very tightly
targeted subsidy to employees is likely to result in little new offering,
as most of the dollars flow to those already in firms offering insurance.
5.4 Non-group Subsidies
The final alternative is to subsidize non-group purchase of insurance.
The prototypical proposal here, which is quite similar to that proposed
by President Bush, would be:
$1000 credit for individuals; $2000 for families
Usable for non-group insurance purchase only
Refundable and advanceable
Phased out for upper-middle- and upper-income families62Gruber
There are several difficulties faced by non-group credits. The first is a
simple fact: roughly half of the uninsured do not pay taxes (Gruber and
Levitt, 2000). This makes the tax code a problematic mechanism for
delivering subsidies to the uninsured. In principle, this can be ad-
dressed by making credits refundable. In practice, this raises two diffi-
culties. First, refundability is a very difficult political goal in recent
years, as many conservatives view refundable credits as akin tocash
welfare. There were enormous battles over the refundability of the child
credit in 1997 and again in 2001, with the result being only very partial
refundability of this credit. Similar battles are likely to occur with these
tax credits.
Second, and more fundamentally, the usefulness of refundability is
quite limited without effective advanceability. Insurance premiums are
due from the beginning of year t, but tax refunds do not arrive until
spring of year t + 1. Thus, the uninsured must have sufficient resources
to advance-fund their insurance purchases if credits are to be effective;
but most uninsured, indeed, most Americans, do not have sufficient
liquid assets to do such advance funding. In principle, this could be
surrounded by legislating an advanceable credit. But our one experience
with such a feature is not encouraging. Individuals can claim their
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) throughout the year rather than the
next spring, and it would be sensible for most claimants to do so; but
fewer than 1% of claimants take advantage of this option (Liebman,
1998). The reasons for this low take-up are unclear, but the main conclu-
sion is that low-income taxpayers appear to be reluctant to take any risk
that they wifi end up facing a tax liability, rather than receiving a refund,
on April 15. This will limit the effectiveness ofadvanceability for a non-
group credit as well.
Finally, the major difficulty faced by such a credit is that non-group
insurance is very expensive. Today, the typical non-group policy for a
family costs $6,000 to $7,000 per year. Thus, even a sizable $2,000 credit
leaves the family with $4,000 to $5,000 in costs to pay, which is enor-
mous relative to the incomes of the working pooruninsured. This point
ties to the earlier issue about market responses. If the insurance market
can respond to the availability of this credit by deliveringlow-cost insur-
ance products that are demanded by the public, then theseaffordability
barriers may be overcome.
As a result of these limitations, my previous work suggests only
modest impacts of nongroup credits on net insurance coverage (Gruber
and Levitt, 2000; Gruber, 2000). This work is based on a major micro-
simulation model that takes as its base the 1997 Current PopulationTaxes and Health Insurance63
Survey, and imposes on that base a complicated set of behavioralequa-
tions that make assumptions on all of the relevant margins in Figure 1
(as detailed in the appendix to Gruber, 2000). The base case is a $1000or
$2000 refundable credit which is not effectively advanceable, due to the
limitations noted above. I assume that this credit is available to singles
with incomes up to $75,000 and families with incomes up to $100,000. It
is worth noting that subsidies that are more tightly income-targetedare
more efficient, as for incomes above the median there are relatively few
uninsured. But, once again, there is an important political question
about whether it is feasible to have a truly targeted new credit in to-
day's environment; all of the middle-class entitlements of the past 5
years have extended to income ranges similar to those used here (or
higher).
I find that for this base-case policy there is a cost of $13.3 billionper
year, and net reduction in the uninsured of 4 million persons, for cost of
$3300 per newly insured, well above the costs cited above for employer
subsidies. The effectiveness of the credit rises significantly if it is ad-
vanceable, but the cost per newly insured remains above $2500. Thus,
non-group credits do not appear nearly as effective as group credits, due
to the problems noted above.
6. CONCLUSIONS
Tax policy towards health insurance is likely to remain a topic of vigor-
ous debate in the years to come. This paper has laid out some key facts,
economic evidence, and policy simulations to help guide this debate.
The key conclusion that I draw from existing facts and evidence is that
policies targeted to firms are more likely to be effective thanare policies
targeted to individuals, as firms appear quite price-responsive in their
insurance-offering decisions, and the actions of firms appear to be di-
rectly translated to individual coverage. But the prevalence of offering
means that to be cost-effective such subsidies must be tightly targeted to
the firms least likely to offer insurance: small and low-wage firms.
The more important conclusion to be drawn from thispaper is that we
still know remarkably little about a number of key parameters that deter-
mine the effectiveness of tax policy towards insurancecoverage. Most
notable among these is the responsiveness, to new subsidies to buying
insurance, of the existing uninsured who are not offered insurance. But
there are a variety of other unanswered questions as well that must be
addressed by future research if we are to draw fully informed conclu-
sions as to the efficacy of tax policy.64Gruber
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